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T imes are changing in Africa. After two decades of poor developmental records, since the beginning of this century the prospects for many African countries are improving in terms of growth and development, although 
the challenges ahead remain huge. Another emerging aspect of the African inter-
national political economy is the growing influence in many respects of other de-
veloping economies, including India, Brazil, and of course China. New partners 
have arrived in a new opportunity for the continent even if it is not a free risk one. 
This growing influence can be seen when checking the evolution of the volumes of 
trade, investment and aid programmes. China is currently the first trade partner 
for the majority of African countries. Beyond these figures, in the case of China 
there is as well an increasingly important presence of Chinese migrants all over 
the continent involved in all sorts of activities (see “China’s Second Continent” 
by Howard W. French published in 2014). Thus, to the aforementioned growing 
economic influence, there is as well an increasing human presence.
Focusing on China, it is important to mention that Chinese presence in Africa 
is not new. In the quest for international recognition and alliances, Mao’s Chi-
na chose to develop particular ties with African governments through aid pro-
grammes, especially in the 60s and the 70s. The Tazara railway, linking Zambia 
and the Tanzanian coast, funded and built with Chinese resources between 1970 
and 1975, was the most important highlight of this era.
Later in the 90s, when the opening up process in China was fully consolidated, 
the focus of the Chinese government in Africa shifted from ideology and diplo-
macy to the promotion of economic interests, particularly trade and investments 
from China. The implementation of the Go Out Policy in 1999 encouraged Chi-
nese firms through various public financing schemes to invest abroad, of course 
including Africa. The increasing consumption of mineral products including oil 
in the domestic Chinese economy, due to its astonishing economic growth, has 
led to many Chinese companies in the extractive sector to invest in African re-
source-abundant countries (in roughly the same way as many other global com-
panies are doing), taking advantage in some cases of previous diplomatic links. 
Angola, Sudan and Zambia would probably be the most prominent examples of 
significant Chinese investments in the extractive sector. Interestingly, these invest-
ments often go along with aid programmes including soft credit for much needed 
infrastructure. To be fair, China’s aid programmes in Africa are not only about 
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‘aid-for-resources’. For instance in Senegal there are some significant Chinese aid 
programmes like a children’s hospital (Diamniado) and some others programmes, 
although Senegal is a resource-poor country. In sum, the Chinese presence in Af-
rica is not new and is increasingly central in the international political economy of 
many African countries.
Beyond the direct economic presence, China is certainly exerting a significant in-
fluence in the formulation of development policies in Africa. Since the 80s, many 
African governments have had to adhere to the Washington Consensus agenda 
pushed on by the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in order to keep cred-
it flowing in. This agenda of neoliberal reform promoted by the Bretton Woods 
institutions has proven detrimental in developmental terms. During the 80s and 
90s, many of the expected economic outcomes, like economic growth or increased 
foreign investment, fell short for the majority of African countries having signed a 
SAP. Moreover, external indebtedness, capital flight and poverty increased. Blam-
ing solely SAPs for these outcomes would be unfair, since institutional dysfunc-
tions in Africa like corruption or the lack of commitment of the African elites with 
the development process are a substantial part of the story. Anyhow, the Washing-
ton Consensus advice has proved limited to boost development in Africa.
In this regard, the so-called Beijing Consensus (as coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo 
in 2004) has been gaining ground since the beginning of this century as an alterna-
tive policy framework for developing countries, especially in Africa. Following 
Cooper Ramo, the Beijing Consensus proposal consists, among other things, in 
putting the state at the centre of the development process (developmental state), 
commitment to innovation and constant experimentation in policies (no one-
size-fits-all policy), conceptualising development not only as GDP growth (it is 
structural change), and keeping national sovereignty (in contrast with the Bret-
ton Woods institutions praxis). African countries are not adopting this emerging 
policy framework by force or as a condition for Chinese credits. It is a rather an 
example of the increasing Chinese influence in the continent.
Another interesting example of this influence are the sort of replica of the China’s 
Special Economic Zones established in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Egypt, Zambia, and 
Mauritius with Chinese co-operation. As in China, these areas are intended to 
attract foreign capital and retain local capital too, in order to establish export-led 
industries provided with upgraded technology, trying to combat the de-industri-
alisation suffered in the SAPs era, and getting African-based industries into global 
value chains.
Is the Chinese presence in Africa contributing to a genuine process of economic 
structural change that could underpin developmental outcomes for the popula-
tion? Or it is rather a new scheme of dependence? Are the claims of neo-coloni-
alism accurate? In our opinion, the Chinese engagement in Africa may be an op-
portunity for the African countries, although not free from obstacles. It may be an 
opportunity if China is taken as a new source of much needed job-creating and 
infrastructure-supporting capital inflow, a source of new ideas on development 
probably better suited for the challenges that African societies face, and a powerful 
friendly partner in the global political arena. Nevertheless, the perils of creating a 
new debt cycle, getting stuck in a new dependence pattern, fatally damaging the 
environment, or not taking advantage of the Chinese investments in the extrac-
tive sector for promoting structural change are real if the public policies of African 
governments are not well suited. In other words, China is an opportunity but ulti-
mately depends on the African development policies to take advantage of it.
